Introduction
Major progress has been made in understanding the way the primate brain learns to anticipate uncertain rewards and about the crucial role of the dopaminergic system in such learning. Much of this work has been driven by Reinforcement Learning (RL) whereby prediction errors in trial t, e t , lead to updates of the prediction x t of the reward (payoff) p t using the Rescorla-Wagner (RW) learning rule:
x t +1 = x t + + e t where is the learning constant (e t = p t -x t ; for generality, we added a constant to the usual formulation). The activation patterns of dopaminergic neurons in the non-human primate brain 1 and of sub-cortical dopaminoceptive areas of the human brain 2, 3 have recently been formalized in terms of such RL models.
In this article, we are interested in the learning constant of the RW rule. To keep things simple, we shall focus on prediction of a single random reward from a single prediction in pure Pavlovian conditioning. However, the approach is not limited to such a simple situation. The RW rule has been successfully applied to learning value functions. Value functions are discounted expected values of a sequence of potential future rewards that apply to complex multi-dimensional stimulus-actionreward situations. They can be obtained with or without potential instrumental interference, and with or without potential variable time delays. In the context of value functions, RL is referred to as TD Learning. 4 The dopamine system in the primate brain is thought to adapt the RW rule to handle TD learning 5 .
In standard expositions of the RW learning rule little attention is paid to the learning constant which is kept constant and often found empirically. But what determines ? We are looking for general answers, which do not require much knowledge about the specific stochastic structure in each possible application, and therefore, answers that feature some amount of robustness.
Least-squares learning theory 6 provides one possible answer. It suggests that is the projection coefficient of predictions onto past prediction errors. Least-squares learning can be defended against more powerful learning rules such as Bayes' law because it is agnostic about the model that u n e d i t e d m a n u s c r i p t generates the stimuli (on which predictions are based) and the rewards. In other words, it is modelfree, and, as such, generates robustness.
As we shall see, the projection coefficient of predictions onto past prediction errors depends on two quantities: (i) the covariance between predictions and past prediction errors, (ii) the variance of the prediction errors. The variance of the prediction error is the expected size of this error. We shall refer to it as the prediction risk.
First, consider the covariance between predictions and past prediction errors. The following example demonstrates how least-squares learning correctly determines based on this covariance. This example shows that retrospective analysis of the correlation between the best possible prediction and prior prediction errors, together with the least squares formula, allows one to determine the right value for the learning rate in the RL.
A fair coin is tossed repeatedly for
Second, consider the dependence of on the prediction risk. Compare the following two situations. This comparison shows that the learning rate should change with the prediction risk. The leastsquares learning formula shows how the learning rate should be adjusted when there are changes in the prediction risk. In the two situations above, least-squares learning theory would provide values that agree with the intuitive prescriptions given.
In the first situation
Consequently, least squares learning theory suggests that effective implementation of RL involves three tasks:
1. To keep track of prediction errors; 2. To encode correlation between the best possible predictions and past prediction errors; 3. To track prediction risk.
Evidence of involvement of the dopamine system in RL of rewards has been limited to the first of these tasks.
The primary purpose of this article is to discuss recent evidence that the dopamine system is engaged in the third task as well. A secondary purpose of the article is to point out that tracking of prediction risk may simultaneously achieve optimal evaluation of options with random outcomes. While no less interesting, we leave discussion of the second task, namely, encoding of the covariance between predictions and prior prediction errors for a future occasion.
But before we discuss evidence of tracking of prediction risk in the dopamine system, let us first present the mathematics of least squares-learning theory. It will suggest that the most effective way to accommodate prediction risk in RL is not by adjusting the learning rate, but by scaling the prediction errors. This ensures that the learning rate depends only on the covariance (between predictions and prior prediction errors), and hence, the learning rate needs to be adjusted only when the covariance changes.
To Simplify Determination Of The Learning Constant, Prediction Risk Should Scale Prediction Errors
According to least squares learning theory, the learning constant should be the coefficient in a projection of predictions on past prediction errors. The projection coefficient is defined to be the ratio of a covariance and a variance. In our setting,
The numerator is the covariance between predictions and past prediction errors. The denominator is the variance of prediction errors. Its square root is the standard deviation of prediction errors, and
this quantity is what we refer to as prediction risk. We will use the symbol to represent it:
= var(e t ).
As such, the RW learning rule becomes
which can be rewritten as:
u n e d i t e d m a n u s c r i p t
As such the learning rate no longer depends on prediction risk, but only on a covariance. We can now define the new learning rate , which depends only on the covariance between the predictions and past scaled prediction errors:
In addition, these same scaled prediction errors can be used to update the predictions -there is no need anymore to keep track of the raw prediction errors:
where
This adaptive encoding simplifies the learning rule, as the learning rate depends only on covariance (i.e., association), and no longer on prediction risk. In other words, the learning rate changes whenever the covariance changes but no longer changes when the prediction risk changes.
Prediction Risk And The Dopaminergic System
The above analysis suggests that any system that is engaged in effective RL should not only encode prediction errors, but also prediction risk, and that prediction risk should be used to scale prediction errors. Evidence has converged over the last ten years that activation of the dopaminergic system in the primate brain reflects prediction errors. Is there any evidence that this system also encodes prediction risk and that prediction errors are scaled? It shows that dopamine neurons in the vental tegmental area of the nonhuman primate brain increase firing in the anticipation period between cue presentation and outcome revelation (reward/no reward), and that the rate of increase correlates with prediction risk. This effect is referred to as "ramping." In the experiment, prediction risk (when measured as reward variance) is maximal when the reward probability equals 0.5; it is minimal for probabilities equal to zero or one. Correspondingly, ramping increases in probability for probabilities up to 0.5, and decreases for higher probabilities.
[ Figure 1 About Here]
A delayed prediction-risk related signal in sub-cortical dopaminoceptive areas was recently uncovered in the human brain as well. 8 In the experiments, subjects were playing a simple card gambling game that allowed the experimenter to vary predicted rewards and prediction risk independently and over a broad range. Figure 2 displays some of the results. It shows that the fMRI BOLD signal in bilateral ventral striatum and other areas increases quadratically in the probability of winning for probabilities less than 0.5, and decreases quadratically for probabilities above 0.5.
This is exactly what one would expect if the signal encodes prediction risk. The evidence matches nicely the extent of risk-related "ramping" in firing of dopamine neurons of the non-human primate brain alluded to before. Closer inspection reveals that this signal is delayed. The response onset to risk is seen only 3-4 seconds after cue onset. The delay is consistent with the "ramping" of dopaminergic neurons in the non-human primate brain: because firing of dopaminergic neurons increases only gradually, BOLD-related activation in dopaminoceptive regions will only become significant after a certain time.
[ Figure 2 About Here]
Controversy exists about the origin of the correlation between prediction risk and "ramping" in dopaminergic neurons or delayed activation in dopaminoceptive areas. Such correlation could spuriously emerge as a result of the averaging of activation across trials on which Figures 1 and 2 are based. 9 The spurious correlation emerges even in a standard TD learning model, with a constant learning rate, and hence, no account for prediction risk. Still, this explanation relies on specific aspects of the TD learning model (back-propagation of prediction errors in the anticipation period) But another way to settle the issues is to look at independent evidence for prediction risk encoding in the dopaminergic system. Independent evidence comes from encoding of prediction errors at reward delivery. Unlike neuronal firing that reflects reward anticipation at stimulus onset, firing that correlates with prediction errors
at reward delivery appears to scale with prediction risk.
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If a stimulus unambiguously signals the size of an upcoming reward, firing rates at the time of reward do not correlate with the size of reward. However, firing rates at the time of the predictive stimulus do. Figure 3 displays the evidence. Three stimuli signal three different reward sizes, all occurring with the same probability.
Firing at stimulus presentation correlates with reward size. Upon reward delivery, however, the firing rate does not depend on reward size. The firing rate only reflects the sign of the prediction error, as when the prediction error is normalized with the prediction risk. The firing rate effectively reflects the scaled prediction error:
Recent analysis in Wolfram Schultz' laboratory of imaging data of ventral striatum confirm this finding for the human brain (unpublished data).
[ Figure 3 About Here]
Such adaptive encoding, as we discussed before, is an effective way to ensure that the learning rate in the RW model depends only on the covariance (between predictions and past scaled prediction errors), and not prediction risk. 
Tracking Prediction Risk: A Dual Goal
There is ample behavioral evidence that primates, in particular humans, are sensitive to risk.
Primates show a varying degree of aversion to risk 12 or, in some context, even a tendency to seek risk. 13 Since behavior shows sensitivity to risk, the primate brain must somehow be engaged not only in forecasting future rewards (forming expectations of rewards) but also in evaluating risk.
But any system that keeps track of prediction risk to facilitate learning simultaneously generates a signal with which risk itself can be evaluated. As such, a single prediction risk signal can serve two purposes: learning and choice. To date, it is not known to what extent the dopaminergic system is involved in determining choice.
When analyzing brain activation in the context of risky choice, neuroscientists have focused on insula. Activation of insula has been shown to be increasing in the amount of uncertainty. It is not known to what extent this activation is related to uncertainty-induced activation in the dopaminergic system. Physiologically, this is possible: anterior insula projects to midbrain dopaminergic nuclei, although projections to the insula are less conclusive. 14 Comparison of the time course of riskrelated activation in insula 15 and in sub-cortical dopaminoceptive structures such as ventral striatum 8 suggest that there is a link. More research is needed to determine the origin of the risk prediction signal in the dopaminergic system and its relationship with insula activity.
While the association between the risk signal in insula and reward learning has not been explored yet, this risk signal does appear to have behavioral implications. The risk signal can be used to predict to what extent subjects choose risky options over safe alternatives. 16 As such, to the extent that the insula signal is also used in learning (as mentioned before, this has not yet been determined), it serves two purposes: decision making as well as learning.
In contrast, the reward anticipation signal in dopaminoceptive structures is known to play a dual role. Its importance for learning is by now well established. Recent evidence indicates that it can also be used to predict to what extent subjects choose more rewarding options over poorer alternatives 16 , and as such, the anticipation signal does serve a decision making as well as a learning purpose. 
Conclusion
Major progress has been made in understanding the way the primate brain learns to anticipate uncertain reward. The crucial role of the dopaminergic system in such learning as well as the nature of the involved learning algorithm (RL) has become appreciated. There is some crucial element missing in the analyses, however. Foremost, least-squares learning principles prescribe that prediction risk needs to be accounted for, so that forecasts react correctly to prediction errors. When prediction risk is sizeable, large prediction errors are to be expected, and hence, updates of forecasts should not be too sensitive to outcomes. Conversely, when prediction risk is small, forecasts need to be updated significantly whenever prediction errors turn out to be large. This is done most effectively, not by adjusting the learning rate, but by scaling prediction errors by prediction risk.
The evidence supports such adaptive encoding. Activation in midbrain dopaminergic neurons in the non-human primate brain and of dopaminoceptive structures in the human brain suggests that the dopamine system not only registers prediction risk during the reward anticipation period, but also that it scales the prediction errors at reward delivery. As such, the dopamine system parameterizes RL using principles of least-squares learning.
Encoding that adapts to prediction risk, however, presupposes that an estimate of the prediction risk is available, which raises the issue of prediction risk learning. While beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to mention that online reinforcement learning algorithms can be used to effectively track prediction risk. 19 The brain mechanism engaged in tracking of prediction risk remains, however, unknown. Still, anterior insula is a prime candidate region for prediction risk learning, because of its known involvement in tracking of uncertainty. We argued that encoding of prediction risk serves a dual role: we emphasized its benefits for optimal learning, but prediction risk encoding also serves to improve choices for risk-sensitive agents. The evidence we cited here converges on a separate representation (spatially, and even temporally) of expected reward and risk. In order to come to an informed evaluation of the trade-off between risk and reward, the separate representations have somehow to be integrated. To date, it is not known how this is accomplished in the brain.
Likewise, little is known about how the brain determines the strength of association (covariance) between predictions and (past, scaled) prediction errors. In least-squares learning theory, this is a crucial parameter that determines the magnitude of the learning constant in RL. One can conjecture that it is obtained through RL, in the same way that RL can lead to an assessment of reward expectation and of reward prediction risk. Evidence is emerging 20 that dorsal anterior cingulate cortex is engaged in monitoring the salience of stimuli, and hence, the extent to which predictions should be adjusted as a function of prediction errors.
Our account is related to recent analysis of expected uncertainty, 21 but instead of exploring possible sources for a prediction risk signal, we studied here its impact on RL in the dopamine system. We have not addressed the issue of unexpected uncertainty, 21 which can be interpreted, in our context, as changes in the association (covariance) between predictors and (past, scaled) prediction errors.
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